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The IGOLD #586 case was the only one in the X-chromosome re-sequencing cohort of 208 with a CCDC22 mutation, suggesting that mutations of CCDC22 are a rare cause of XLID. Here we highlight CCDC22 as a novel XLID candidate gene for future targeted re-sequencing studies and propose that the mRNA downregulation associated with the described mutation likely results from reduced transcriptional efficiency rather than nonsense-mediated mRNA decay.
Identifying false, but apparently plausible, explanations for the onset of psychiatric disorder Kendler et al. 1 showed that seemingly plausible explanations for psychiatric disorder may not be causal risk factors for psychiatric disorder. This is not the first time an apparently understandable cause of psychiatric disorder has been associated with a significantly elevated familial risk for the same disorder. 2, 3 Distinguishing causal risk factors from false, but apparently plausible, explanations for the onset of psychiatric disorders is important for advancing our understanding of the aetiology of psychiatric disorders and for the translation of research findings into welldesigned clinical trials or intervention studies.
Example 1: Individuals with a psychotic disorder judged by experienced clinicians to be likely to have an organic cause (due to accidental head trauma, infections, substance abuse) had a significantly higher familial risk for psychosis than individuals judged to have an idiopathic or 'primary' psychosis. 2 The elevated relative risk was only significant for schizophrenia, not for other forms of psychosis.
Apparently organic psychoses were therefore more strongly associated with familial risk for schizophrenia than other psychoses.
Example 2: Increasingly traumatic exposure to apparently salient stimuli for the development of animal, situational or a composite of (any) phobias was associated with a significantly higher risk for phobia in the co-twin. 3 Increasingly traumatic experiences with (apparent) salience for the development of animal, situational or other phobias was therefore more strongly associated with familial risk for phobias than less traumatic experiences.
Example 3: Stressful life events with increasing (apparent) salience for the onset of a depressive episode (described by Kendler as level of rated understandability) were significantly and positively associated with increasing risk for depression in a co-twin. 1 The stressful life events that appeared most likely to precipitate depression were therefore more strongly associated with familial risk for depression than apparently less salient life events.
All three examples are inconsistent with the liability threshold model of aetiology, which assumes the presence of independent (additive) genetic and environmental risk factors. This model postulates that the threshold for disorder can be met by X units of environmental risk and/or Y units of familial risk. In the presence of more X units it is assumed that fewer Y units are required to develop disorder. Environmental factors correlated with the onset of disorder are presumed to be uncorrelated with severity of familial liability (i.e., the number of X units are presumed to be uncorrelated with the number of Y units) and are not typically analysed in a way that tests that assumption. Going forward they should be, and the results presented to show if the putative risk factor is partly or wholly a proxy for increasing familial risk for the outcome of interest, and what percentage of variance in familial risk for the predictor and the outcome is explained by the correlation. None of the three examples cited above present their statistics in that way. Although highly intuitive, if we assume an additive model of risk, the liability threshold model does not always fit observed psychiatric data. These three examples do, however, highlight the ongoing importance of using genetically informative designs (families, twins, singleton siblings) to estimate familial risk in the absence of a molecular explanation for heritability estimates.
